Hamburg – 20 February 2013 Dr Jérôme Guillet



- 1. Equity
- 2. Debt
- 3. Case study: Walney



GGEB – the offshore wind finance specialists

We have an unparalleled track record in successfully closing deals for our clients

- 21 professionals in Hamburg (DE), London (UK), Utrecht (NL) and Paris (FR)
- Project & structured finance, M&A & contracting expertise
- · Focus on offshore wind





















Advisor to Highland in the acquisition of the Deutsche Bucht project 210 MW Highland Group Holdings Germany 2012



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2. Equity

Major transactions in 2012

- Enova portfolio (DE, 4 projects, purchase by Hochtief/Ventizz)
 - Early stage projects
 - Underlines the strategy by some contractors to get involved in project development to secure construction contracts
- Borkum Riffgrund I (DE, 277 MW, Siemens 3.6 MW, 50% sold by DONG to Oticon/LEGO group)
 - Project previously purchased from PNE in 2009 at EUR 56 M 0.20 MEUR/MW
 - Sale of 50% to private investor at DKK 4,700 M (EUR 630 M 4.66 MEUR/MW) includes construction costs + development premium
 - Follows DONG's traditional strategy to develop and build projects and sell minority stakes with no construction risk
- Rhiannon (UK Round 3, up to 4,200 MW, 50% sold by Centrica to DONG)
- Navitus Bay (UK Round 3, up to 1,200 MW, 50% sold by ENECO to EDF)
 - Part of the "reshuffling of the cards" of the UK Round 3 projects
- Gode Wind I, II & III (DE, 900 MW, 100% sold by PNE to DONG)
 - Purchase of 3 projects at various stages of development by DONG at EUR 157 M, i.e. EUR 0.17 MEUR /MW
- Dudgeon (UK, 560 MW, 100% sold by Warwick Energy to Statkraft/Statoil)
 - One of the few projects developed by an independent taken up by utilities
- Deutsche Bucht (DE, 210 MW, 100% sold by Windreich to Highland Holdings)
 - Purchase from an independent developer by a financial investor



2. Equity

Some lessons


- An active market and a wider range of investors beyond utilities than people assume
 - Infrastructure funds and pensions funds (PensionDanmark, TCW, PGGM)
 - Private equity groups (Blackstone, etc)
 - Corporations with specific strategies (LEGO, Colruyt, Marubeni)
 - and many more sniffing around the sector
- Valuations are actually relatively consistent
 - Permitted projects development cost + premium @ 200kEUR/MW
 - Contracted projects construction cost @ 3.5MEUR/MW unlevered (or 1.1 MEUR/MW levered)
 - Operational projects linked to regulatory framework and IRR target of investors (8-10%)
- Trade off between construction risk and returns now closely examined
 - As more assets are operational, the universe of investors grows and IRR targets are going down
 - A number of investors are now looking to take construction risk to improve returns (to double digits)
 - A "bankable" deal is also one which many investors can find attractive



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Crisis? What crisis?






HOW - 20 February - Dr. Guillet

Project finance already finances a significant fraction of overall capacity

Offshore wind project financed volumes





Market trends

Typical project finance conditions - offshore	Leverage	Maturity post-completion	Pricing	Maximum underwriting
2006-2007	60:40	10-15 years	150-200 bp	50-100 M
2009	70:30	15 years	300 bp	30-50 M
2010-2011	65:35	12-15 years	250-300 bp	50-75 M
Current market	70:30	10-15 years	275-375 bp	30-50 M

- Banks are refocusing again on known clients, core countries and strategic sectors of activity
 - The only good news is that offshore wind is unambiguously "strategic" for many banks today
 - Countries where offshore wind is developing are seen as "safe" (Germany until now) and core for most banks
- Margins are shooting up again
 - This reflects an increase in the banks' cost of funding rather than an increase in the cost of risk
 - But the underlying long term cost of money is falling (in a mirror image), so the overall cost of debt is actually decreasing
- Structures (ratios, maturity, covenants) have actually been quite stable since 2007



4 transactions in 2012

- Gunfleet Sands (UK, 86 MW, Siemens 3.6 MW, GBP 158 M financing)
 - Refinancing of Marubeni's 49% stake in the (operational) project the first financing of a minority stake
 - NEXI-driven transaction, demonstrating "Japan Inc." appetite for offshore wind
- Lincs (UK, 270 MW, Siemens 3.6 MW, GBP 500 M financing)
 - First construction risk transaction in the UK
 - large commercial banking group (10 banks) and no public financing institutions
 - 15-year debt, again with standard debt sizing (UK "blended" DSCR)
- Northwind (Belgium, 216 MW, Vestas V112M, EUR 595 M financing)
 - Traditional Belgian offshore wind deal including construction risk, and showing that Vestas is still bankable
 - New ECAs involved ONDD and GIEK/EksportKreditt Norge, alongside EIB and EKF (funded by PensionDanmark)
 - 15-year debt funding made available, under traditional debt sizing rules (70:30 gearing)
- Walney (UK, 92 MW offshore, Siemens 3.6 MW, GBP 224 M financing)
 - Refinancing of PGGM and Ampere's 25% stake in the 367 MW (operational) project
 - First transaction for the GIB but transaction was largely funded by commercial banks
 - Shorter maturity but traditional debt sizing (70:30 gearing)



The lessons from 2012

Good projects can find money

- Most active market ever, despite the crisis and the atmosphere of gloom
- Very different transaction profiles, but all managed to obtain competitive debt conditions
- There is no "UK malediction" (just like there is no "Germany malediction")
- No bank or individual institution is indispensable

The market is consistent in its requirements

- Debt sizing principles are quite stable and predictable
- Due diligence standards and main covenants are similar across transactions
- The same rules apply in different countries and with different banks involved

And meanwhile, the projects under construction have been giving a lot of work to project finance bankers...

Construction finance is a full time job

- Multiple time-consuming issues need to be dealt with throughout the construction period
- Project management competence is of overriding importance
- Banks are building a lot of experience which will be valuable for future projects




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A UK Round 2 project


- The Walney project consists of two find farms (Walney 1 and Walney 2), each of them comprising 51 Siemens 3.6 MW turbines resulting in 367 MW of total installed capacity
- The project was developed by DONG
- Walney 1 has been fully operational since 9 July 2011, Walney 2 has been fully operational since 11 June 2012
- Walney benefits from the incentive system of the Round 2 offshore wind farms with 2 ROCs/MWh and 1 LEC/MWh
- The technology used is the Siemens 3.6-107 WTG on Walney 1 and the Siemens 3.6-120 WTG with a larger rotor for Walney 2





A novel 2-tier structure Construction A. Divestment to another utility - No PF contracts Minority share All contracts are signed between the project company **New investor** and the contractors (the utility that initially owns the **Project Assets** wind farm being potentially one of them) Company Utility Keep control The project company also owns the assets **Operating** The new investor finances the minority stake on BS contracts B. PF at project level (with or without divestment) Construction Debt – up to 70% The banks finance a large portion of project costs on a contracts Banks non-recourse basis with direct security on contracts and **Project** Minority share assets and some influence on project management **New investor** Assets Company The initial utility or developer can sell a stake to a new investor; they finance the equity portion pro-rata Utility **Operating** Keep control contracts C. Divestment to a new investor – PF at holding level • New investor invests in a Construction Debt project through a SPV, "Holdco" around 70% contracts Banks Banks lend to Holdco on a non-Minority share Holdco **Project** recourse basis with indirect Assets **New investor** Equity Company security on project and limited Utility around 30% Keep control influence on management **Operating** contracts








What made the deal bankable

The core need was to make banks comfortable with indirect and limited control over the project and its operations

- No construction risk
 - Refinancing took place after completion
- Direct control over revenue stream
 - OPW Holdco had access to its share of overall project production and could sell it on its own (and pledge that to banks)
- Strong indirect security package
 - Pledge on the stake in the project company and the contracts involving OPW Holdco
 - Minority rights for Holdco in the project company shareholder agreement
 - Right for banks to step-in in downside scenarios, with agreed procedures with other shareholders





What made the deal bankable (2)

The financing structure was aligned with the commercial structure

- Long term contracts made it possible to size debt as per traditional yardsticks
 - 70:30 gearing reached
 - "Mini-perm" structure aligned with duration of commitments on O&M and equity retention
- Full due diligence package
 - Technical, legal, insurance, accounting, tax, market advisors involved
- Full support of the majority shareholder
 - Structure initially designed by DONG with the aim of making a non-recourse financing possible
 - Strong cooperation provided during due diligence process and final negotiations
- Strong banking group
 - 4 experienced commercial lenders: Lloyds, RBS, Santander, Siemens Bank
 - Debut transaction for GIB, on a fully pari passu basis with commercial banks



Green Giraffe Energy Bankers

8 rue d'Uzès, 75002 Paris
tel: + 331 4221 3663
email: fr@green-giraffe.eu

Utrecht
tel: + 31 30 820 0334
email: nl@green-giraffe.eu

London Hamburg



133 Houndsditch, London EC3A 7BX

tel: + 4475 5400 0828

email: uk@green-giraffe.eu



Mattentwiete 5, 20457 Hamburg

tel: + 4917 6551 28283

email: de@green-giraffe.eu